

of *Every-day Life Treated as a Pretended Dream and Interpreted by Psychoanalysis* (pp. 32-45): RAYMOND BELLAMY. — An attempt is made to show "that any situation or experience can be analyzed with as good success as a dream and that a dream may be made to mean anything." A situation is analyzed and found to be a suppressed sexual wish; an analyzed dream shows the fulfilment of a fear. "Whatever we wish to make out of a dream—the dramatization of a fear, a joy, a joke, a tragedy, anything that can be suggested,—the result can easily be accomplished if only we be allowed the use of Freud's mechanisms and a moderate amount of symbolism." *Freud and his School: New Paths of Psychology* (pp. 46-66): A. W. VAN RENTERGHEM. — This paper is a continuation of one in the last issue of the *Journal*. Analyses are presented which have been made on cases of nervous prostration, of sleeplessness, of fear neurosis. The writer concludes, "Freud's great service is that he has opened before the physician a path which leads to the cause." *Reviews*: Eben W. Fiske, *An Elementary Study of the Brain*: E. W. TAYLOR. B. S. Morgan, *The Backward Child*: RAYMOND BELLAMY. Sir Oliver Lodge, *Continuity*: G. V. N. DEARBORN. H. A. BRUCE, *Adventurings in the Psychical*: HERWARD CARRINGTON. R. BENON, *Des Troubles Psyiques et Nevrosiques Post-Traumatiques*: E. W. TAYLOR. V. J. SPRINGER, *Verbrechertypen*: M. J. KÄRPAS. L. T. HOBHOUSE, *Development and Purpose*: G. V. N. DEARBORN.

Books Received.

- Armstrong, Robert Cornell. *Light from the East*. University of Toronto Studies in Philosophy. University of Toronto: Published by the Librarian. 1914. Pp. xv + 326. \$1.50.
- Herrick, C. Judson and Coghill, George E. *The Development of Reflex Mechanisms in Amblystoma*. Reprinted from *Journal of Comparative Neurology*. Pp. 20.
- Marconi, Henri. *Histoire de L'Involution Naturelle*. Traduite de L'Italien par M^e. Ida Mori-Dupont. Paris: A. Maloine. Lugano: Maisons d'Editions du "Coenobium." 1915. 15 Fr.
- Martin, Lillien J. *Ein Experimenteller Beitrag zur Erforschung des Unterbewissten*. Leipzig: Verlag von J. A. Barth. 1915. Pp. vi + 164. 5 M.

NOTES AND NEWS

LETTER FROM BERTRAND RUSSELL

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS:

In a quotation from the *Athenaeum* printed in this JOURNAL,¹ I am represented as having said, "there may be perspectives where there are no minds; but we can not know anything of what sort of perspectives they may be, for the sense-datum is mental." I did not see the *Athenaeum*, and do not remember what I said, but it can not have been what I am reported as having said, for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is *not* mental—indeed my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that

¹ Volume XII., page 308.

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the sense-datum is purely physical. The fact of being a datum is mental, but a particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be casually dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain. Since we carry those about with us, we can not discover what sensibilia, if any, belong to perspectives from places where there is no brain. And since a particular of which we are aware is a sense-datum, we can not be aware of particulars which are not sense-data, and can, therefore, have no empirical evidence as to their nature. This is merely the "egocentric predicament"; it is a tautology, not a "great truth." It is for this reason, and not because "sense-data are mental," that we can not know the nature of those perspectives (if any) which belong to places where there are no minds.

I do not know what is the definition of "mental." In order to obtain a definition, I should first inquire what would necessarily be removed from the world if it were what one would naturally call a world without mind. I see no reason why colors or noises should be removed, but facts which involve such relations as perceiving, remembering, desiring, enjoying, believing would necessarily be removed. This suggests that no *particulars* of which we have experience are to be called "mental," but that certain *facts*, involving certain *relations*, constitute what is essentially mental in the world of our experience. (I use the word "fact" to designate that which makes a proposition true or false; it includes, I think, everything in the world except what is simple.) The term "mental," therefore, will be applicable to all facts involving such relations as those enumerated above. This is not yet a definition, since obviously these relations all have some common characteristic, and it must be this characteristic which will yield the proper definition of the term "mental." But I do not know what this characteristic is.

Very truly yours,

B. RUSSELL.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
June 7, 1915.

Dr. Vida F. Moore, professor of philosophy and pedagogy at Elmira College, who died on June 11, was born at Steuben, Maine, the daughter of Captain Henry D. and Susan Kingsley Moore. After her graduation from Wesleyan in 1893 she became a professor of philosophy at Mount Holyoke College, where she remained until 1897, and in 1901 joined the Faculty of Elmira College. She received her Ph.D. from Cornell in 1900. Professor Moore was a trustee of the Steele Memorial Library at Elmira, and a member of the American Philosophical Association, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the fraternity of Phi Beta Kappa. She was the author of "Ethical Aspect of Lotze's Metaphysics," and was a contributor to the *American Journal of Psychology*, the *Cyclopædia of Education*, and other publications.

The death has been announced of Dr. Stefan Witasek, director of the psychological laboratory at Gratz, at the age of forty-five years.